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Abstract
This Essay examines both the U.S. law and the EU law through the window of a recent U.S.
case: New York Mercantile Exchange v. Intercontinental Exchange (“NYMEX”). The NYMEX
facts are similar in concept to the facts in IMS but present a stronger case for liability. The Essay
argues that the opinion in NYMEX, along with a growing set of U.S. cases, interprets Trinko to
impose rigid requirements on a Section 2 plaintiff, not all of which are inherent in Trinko. It
argues that the formalistic post-Trinko analysis, which would require dismissal of cases that do
not fit within one of two “black boxes,” immunizes some conduct that is anticompetitive in both
purpose and effect, while the EU rule (although itself not perfect) can recognize and remedy a
broader set of problems.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States and the European Union ("EU") share a
perspective on antitrust, intellectual property ("IP"), and unilat-
eral refusals-to-deal. The owner of IP normally has no duty to
license it and, particularly, no duty to grant a license to competi-
tors to help them compete against the IP owner.' There are,
however, exceptions, and at this point the systems diverge. U.S.
courts take their cue from Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Of
fices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP ("Trinko"),2 which, although not an
IP case, mandates dismissal of most refusal-to-deal cases under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.3 In the EU, the case of particular
relevance is IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. ADC Health GmbH
& Co. KG ("IMS"), in which the Court of Justice laid down lim-
ited conditions under which a dominant firm's refusal to license
IP to a competitor constitutes an abuse of a dominant position in
violation of Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community.4
* Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation at New York University
School of Law. This Essay is dedicated to my dear friend Valentine Korah, whose count-
less intellectual and personal kindnesses continually enrich me.
1. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 253 F.3d 695 (Fed. Cir. 2001); IMS Health
GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R.
2. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
3. See id. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization and attempts to
monopolize. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
4. See IMS, [2004] E.C.R. _, 17; see also The Treaty Establishing the European
Community, art. 82, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinaf-
ter EC Treaty]; incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992,
O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on Euro-
pean Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single
European Act, O.J. L. 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]. The
Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") was amended by the Treaty
of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These amendments were incorporated into the EC
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This Essay examines both the U.S. law and the EU law
through the window of a recent U.S. case: New York Mercantile
Exchange v. Intercontinental Exchange ("NYMEX").' The NYMEX
facts are similar in concept to the facts in IMS but present a
stronger case for liability.6 The Essay argues that the opinion in
NYMEX, along with a growing set of U.S. cases,7 interprets Trinko
to impose rigid requirements on a Section 2 plaintiff, not all of
which are inherent in Trinko.8 It argues that the formalistic post-
Trinko analysis, which would require dismissal of cases that do
not fit within one of two "black boxes,"9 immunizes some con-
duct that is anticompetitive in both purpose and effect, while the
EU rule (although itself not perfect) can recognize and remedy
a broader set of problems.
There remain many larger antitrust/IP problems beyond
the scope of this Essay. This Essay seeks merely to show that
there are pro-competitive applications of the IMS rule and an-
ticompetitive applications of the Trinko rule, and that Trinko
combined with post-Trinko decisions widen the gap between U.S.
and EU law. Furthermore, despite the rhetoric of enthusiasm
for convergence of law, neither side of the Atlantic Ocean is
likely to be convinced by the other within the subject matter of
this Essay. This is because the United States is now wedded to a
principle of noninterference with unilateral decisions and espe-
cially abhors affirmative duties, even if a rule of law imposing
such duties would increase competition," and the EU has
Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty were renumbered in the Consolidated version
of the Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79
[hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amster-
dam, supra.
5. See generally N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc. 323 F.
Supp. 2d 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter NYMEX].
6. See id. at 568-70.
7. See, e.g., Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 672-73,
675-76 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Metronet Serv. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124,
1131-34 (9th Cir. 2004); Covad Communications Co. v. Bell South Corp., 374 F.3d 1044,
1048-49 (l1th Cir. 2004); Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d
1288, 1296-97 (l1th Cir. 2004); Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications,
Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 535-39 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
8. See NYMEX, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 568-70 (citing Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)).
9. The boxes are: 1) a crippled essential facilities doctrine; and 2) a "limited Aspen
exception." See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 399, 409 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
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neither a principle of noninterference nor an aversion to affirm-
ative duties.11
I. IMS
We first review the facts and law of our two guideposts, IMS
and Trinko, and then ask how NYMEX fits within them.
IMS Health, Inc. ("IMS"), a market research company, pro-
vides services to the pharmaceutical industry.12 Working with
the pharmaceutical industry, it devised a "brick structure" in
which it divided Germany into 1860 geographic areas (the "1860
brick structure") that it used to measure and report sales of indi-
vidual pharmaceutical products. 3 IMS used the 1860 brick
structure as a format for categorizing and reporting data that is
the central feature of IMS' German regional and wholesaler
data-information services.1 4 German copyright law allegedly pro-
tects this format. 5
National Data Corporation ("NDC") entered the German
market to provide marketing data to the pharmaceutical indus-
try, in competition with IMS.16 When it endeavored to use its
own formatting data, it found the industry resistant; the compa-
nies demanded the data formatted in the 1860 brick system, to
which they had become accustomed.1 7 NDC asked IMS for a li-
cense for the brick structure format, but IMS refused." NDC
thereupon began selling marketing data to the pharmaceutical
industry based on copies of the 1860 brick structure, thereby,
according to IMS, infringing the German copyright. 19
While proceedings pended in the Commission, IMS sued in
a German court to prohibit NDC from using the IMS brick struc-
11. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION
LAW AND PRACTICE chs. 4 & 5, including point 5.2.5.2 at 150 (2004).
12. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-
418/01, [2004] E.C.R. -, 4.
13. See id.
14. See id. 5.
15. Two German courts, the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main and the Ober-
landesgericht Frankfurt am Main, held in 2001 that German copyright law protected
IMS' right to use of the brick structure. See id. 10.
16. See id. 7. A former IMS manager left the company in 1998 and founded
Pharma Intranet Information AG, which was later acquired by National Data Corp.
("NDC").
17. See id.
18. See id. 9.
19. See id. 7, 10.
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ture.20 The national court referred to the European Court of
Justice questions concerning the circumstances under which a
refusal to license constitutes an abuse of dominance under Arti-
cle 82 of the EC Treaty." The Court of Justice replied that the
exercise of an exclusive right may constitute an abuse of domi-
nance only in exceptional circumstances. 22 First, access to the
product, service, or IP must be indispensable to enable the un-
dertaking to carry on business in a market.2 To find indispens-
ability, it must be determined whether there are products or ser-
vices which constitute alternative solutions, even if they are less
advantageous, and whether there are technical, legal, or eco-
nomic obstacles capable of making it impossible or unreasonably
difficult for any undertaking seeking to operate in the market to
create, possibly in cooperation with other operators, the alterna-
tive products or services.24
If access is indispensable, three additional conditions are
sufficient: "[N]amely, [1] that that refusal is preventing the
emergence of a new product for which there is a potential con-
sumers demand, [2] that it is unjustified and [3, that it is] such
as to exclude any competition on a secondary market."25
The secondary product or service need not be marketed
separately from the product/service to which access is sought.26
"[I]t is sufficient that a potential market or even hypothetical
market can be identified. ' 27 The German national court then
had the duty to apply these principles.
II. TRINKO
Trinko28 was a regulated industries case. Verizon Communi-
20. See id. 9, 10.
21. See id. 17, 21.
22. See id. 36-38.
23. See id. 22.
24. See id. 28.
25. Id. 38.
26. See id. 43.
27. Id. 43-44. The Court continued:
Transposed to the facts of the case in the main proceedings, that approach
prompts consideration as to whether the 1860 brick structure constitutes, up-
stream, an indispensable factor in the downstream supply of German regional
sales data for pharmaceutical products.
Id. 46
28. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004).
2005] 955
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cations, Inc. ("Verizon") was the incumbent local telecommuni-
cations carrier in the northeastern United States. 29 As such it
controlled the local loop, access to which is necessary for any
telecommunications carrier to provide local service.30 When
new technologies allowed for competition in the local markets,
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996,31 in-
tended to facilitate entry and competition in the local markets
and, among other things, requiring the incumbent to give other
local service providers access to the local loop equal to the access
it enjoyed, at a price set by the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC") on the basis of cost plus a reasonable return on
investment.3 2 Verizon failed to give equal access to its rivals. 3 It
degraded their access. The FCC so found and imposed reme-
dies, and Verizon settled with the discriminated-against rivals for
large sums.3 4 Customers of the discriminated-against rivals,
through the lead plaintiff - a lawyer who claimed to have lost
clients as a result of the inferior telephone service, then
launched an antitrust case under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 5 The case came to the Supreme Court on Verizon's mo-
tion to dismiss.36
The Court considered dismissing the antitrust claims on
grounds of preemption by the 1996 Telecommunications Act.3 7
But the 1996 Act expressly provides that the antitrust laws con-
tinue to apply, side by side the regulatory obligations; so pre-
emption was not an available route. 8
The Court then turned to Section 2 of the Sherman Act.3 °
It emphasized the limits of Section 2, formulating the question
before it as whether Verizon's conduct fell within one of two pos-
sible exceptions from the strong principle of freedom to refuse
to deal.4 ° The Court stated that there are two possible excep-
29. See id. at 402.
30. See id.
31. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1996).
32. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2004); see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402.
33. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 403-04.
34. See id. at 404.
35. See id. at 404-05.
36. See id. at 405.
37. See id. at 405-07.
38. See id. at 406.
39. See id. at 407.
40. See id. at 407-08.
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tions from the freedom-not-to deal principle: 1) the Aspen Ski-
ing 41 exception,4 2 and 2) the essential facilities exception. 41 As
to the latter, the Court said it has never endorsed the existence
of an essential facilities doctrine; but if there is such a doctrine,
it is available only where the defendant has deprived rivals of
complete access to the essential facility or an agency has the
power to order access.44 The rivals in Trinko already had access
to the local loop, and the FCC had ordered access.4" Therefore,
the essential facilities exception, if any, did not apply.46
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. was more
complicated. In Aspen Skiing the Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed a jury verdict condemning Aspen Skiing Company,
owner of the three flagship ski mountains in Aspen, for refusing
to cooperate with its small (one-mountain) rival in providing a
four-mountain ticket - which skiers desired.4 7 The Court in
Aspen Skiing articulated a duty-to-deal principle: a monopolist's
refusal to deal is illegal when it significantly excludes rivals, un-
less defendant proves an efficiency justification.4" The Trinko
Court, not sympathetic with Aspen Skiing, set about to distinguish
the case on its facts as well as to limit its scope.4 9 In doing so it
emphasized the following: The Aspen Skiing Company had pre-
viously cooperated with its rival, Aspen Highlands; the termina-
tion of this cooperation was the refusal to deal.5" Presumably
the prior course of dealing was profitable or it would not have
occurred. Therefore the refusal to deal "suggested a willingness
to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive
end."51 By way of contrast, Verizon never voluntarily gave its ri-
41. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
42. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
43. See id. at 410.
44. See id. at 411.
45. See id. at 403.
46. See id. at 411. Prior to Trinko, in some of the most compelling essential facili-
ties cases, the firm that controlled the essential facility gave its rivals partial access to
that facility. This was true in the AT&T cases, pre-break-up. AT&T did not refuse long
distance competitors access to the local loop (to enable delivery of their signals to their
destination); it "merely" found multitudinous ways to frustrate this access. See United
States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1352-53 (D.D.C. 1981).
47. See generally Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985). See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-09.
48. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605, 608.
49. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
50. See id.
51. Id.
20051 957
958 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:952
vals access to the local loop; it probably would not have done so
absent statutory compulsion.5 2  "Here, therefore, the defen-
dant's prior conduct sheds no light upon the motivation of its
refusal to deal - upon whether its [conduct was] prompted not
by competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice."53
Thus, the Trinko Court used Aspen Skiing's shift from a
prior course of dealing to infer that Aspen Skiing's refusal im-
posed short-term losses on it (although this was not necessarily
the case)," and suggested that anyone who would choose short-
term losses must be up to no good (this choice reflected "an-
ticompetitive malice" rather than "competitive zeal")." Bundled
in this thought and leading to the inference of malice was the
statement that Aspen Skiing was apparently willing to forsake
short-term profits - words that strikingly resemble a popular
proposed liability test that would confine the reach of Section 2;
namely, the proposition that a (monopoly) firm does not violate
Section 2 unless it sacrifices profits en route to enhancing its
power, recouping its investment in predation, and charging
higher monopoly prices in the longer run.5 6
The Trinko opinion is a conservative one. The author, Jus-
tice Scalia, is no admirer of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. But
the opinion does not articulate a liability rule for Section 2 (e.g.,
a sacrifice-of-profits test). In the passages it devotes to Aspen Ski-
ing it does not canvass the possible liability rules for Section 2,
much less find the sacrifice-of-profits test sufficient to catch an-
ticompetitive strategies and superior to its alternatives. Rather, it
makes factual if not factitious distinctions, 57 thereby disposing of
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. It may be presumed that Aspen Skiing Company made more money by shifting
skiers to an all-Aspen Skiing ticket than it would have made from the four-mountain
ticket under a revised formula for sharing revenues. In addition, it probably made
money by refusing to sell Highlands its tickets at retail because it could sell those tickets
directly to the skiers, and would probably sell more tickets if it declined to support
Highlands' packet.
55. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
56. See Thomas Kauper, Section 2 of the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards,
Presentation at the Third Annual Miles W. Kirkpatrick Antitrust Lecture (Mar. 30,
2004), in GEO. L.J. (discussing the sacrifice-of-profits test) (in publication).
57. An example of this is that the Court distinguishes Aspen on grounds that Aspen
Skiing's particular conduct gave rise to an inference of anticompetitive malice and Ver-
izon did not engage in that particular conduct. But of course there are many other
routes to proof of anticompetitive malice, if that is needed. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 399.
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Aspen Skiing as precedent. Then it drives inexorably toward its
conclusion that Verizon's alleged anticompetitive practices were
mere "regulatory lapses" that the sector regulation took care of
and were not of antitrust dimension.58
In Trinko's aftermath, lower courts tend to require that re-
fusal-to-deal cases involve either complete denial of access to an
essential facility or fit the Aspen Skiing exception; and for the lat-
ter they tend to require that defendant 1) engaged in a prior
course of dealing with the firms harmed, and 2) engaged in a
sacrifice-of-profits scenario. 9 NYMEX is no exception.
III. NYMEX
In NYMEX, ° the Intercontinental Exchange ("ICE") devel-
oped a new, computer-based exchange to compete against the
monopoly incumbent, New York Mercantile Exchange
("NYMEX"), in providing a market for the trading of certain nat-
ural gas and oil futures contracts.6 1 NYMEX operated by the old
methodology of "open outcry:" brokers and traders transacted
business in physical communication on a physical trading
floor.6 2 ICE's presence on the market would add a modern vir-
tual alternative.6"
An exchange matches buyers and sellers who wish to make a
transaction in the same quantities at the same prices.6 4 After a
match occurs, NYMEX would act as the clearing house.6 5 The
clearing house assumes the credit risk of each party, guarantee-
ing its performance to the other.6 6 During the time that con-
tracts remain open, each party pays or receives money based on
the value of the contract.6 7 The value of the contract and its
58. See id. at 409-10, 412.
59. See, e.g., Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 672-
73, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Metronet Serv. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1131-
34 (9th Cir. 2004); Covad Communications Co. v. Bell South Corp., 374 F.3d 1044,
1048-50 (11th Cir. 2004); Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d
1288, 1296-98 (l1th Cir. 2004); Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications,
Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 535-39 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
60. 323 F. Supp. 2d 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
61. See id. at 564.
62. See id. at 562.
63. See id. at 564.
64. See id. at 562.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
2005]
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changes in value are assessed by reference to a settlement
price." NYMEX determined the settlement price, through its
settlement committee, at the end of each day.6 9 Allegedly, this
determination was the necessary result of formulaic calcula-
tions.7 ° NYMEX's settlement prices became the standard.7'
Contract parties would not accept a settlement price other than
NYMEX's.
7 2
The sector regulator, the Commodities Future Trading
Commission ("CFTC"), required contract markets to make their
settlement prices "readily available to the news media and the
general public no later than the business day following the day
to which the [settlement prices] pertain [ ] ." NYMEX provided
its settlement prices to subscribers on a "real time" basis, usually
within a half hour of NYMEX's release of the data.7 4 However, it
required subscribers to agree to use the data only for their inter-
nal business and not to use the "real time" prices in competition
with NYMEX.75
ICE, as noted, entered the market for executing the
trades. 76 It alleged that, after the collapse of Enron, market par-
ticipants became especially concerned with counterparty credit
risk, and they began to demand that it, ICE, provide clearing
services as well as execution services.7 7 ICE began to do so, tak-
ing NYMEX settlement prices centrally into account, as it had to
do. 7
8
At that point NYMEX, allegedly to quash the threat that ICE
posed as an electronic trading market, claimed that its settle-
ment prices were subject to copyright protection, and it sued
ICE for infringement.79 ICE counterclaimed for violation of Sec-
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 562-63.
71. See id. at 563.
72. See id. at 565 ("ICE alleges that if it did not finally settle its cleared contracts
against the NYMEX price, the contracts would have little value to market participants,
because even a small discrepancy results in the introduction of unacceptable 'basis risk,'
which is the risk of incorrectly matching offsetting transactions.").
73. See id. at 569 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 16.01 (2004)).
74. See id. at 563.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 562-64.
77. See id. at 565.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 566.
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tion 2 of the Sherman Act, based on NYMEX's refusal to allow
instantaneous use of its settlement prices.4
NYMEX moved to dismiss the counterclaim.8 ' Its motion
was granted on the basis of Trinko.8 2 The district court held that
the facts did not come within the limited "Aspen Skiing excep-
tion" from the freedom-to-not-deal principle, nor did they come
within the essential facilities doctrine.8 3
The district court held the essential facilities doctrine was
not available because ICE had some access to the data (although
this access was not timely enough for ICE's effective competi-
tion), and because the CFTC had the power to regulate the
scope of access.8 4 It held the Aspen Skiing exception unavailable
because ICE and NYMEX had no prior history of cooperation in
sharing the use of the settlement prices.8 " Therefore, it said:
NYMEX's "prior conduct sheds no light upon the motivation
of its refusal to deal." There is no indication that NYMEX is
flouting consumer demand and foregoing short-term profits
by refusing to cooperate with ICE. And unlike the defendant
in Aspen Skiing, NYMEX has proffered a legitimate business
justification for its refusal to deal with ICE. NYMEX has a
legitimate business interest in preventing its competitor, ICE,
from free-riding on NYMEX's settlement prices.8 6
IV. APPLYING EUROPEAN LAW; COMPARING TRINKO
If facts identical to NYMEX arose in the EU, the questions
and answers would predictably follow the following script:
1. Was ICE's timely access to the NYMEX settlement prices
indispensable to ICE's business as a trading market?87 A fact-
finder could find: Yes. Without immediate access to the settle-
ment prices, it would be "unreasonably difficult for any under-
taking seeking to operate in the market to create.., the alterna-
tive products or services."88
80. See id. at 567-68.
81. See id. at 560-61.
82. See id. at 568-70.
83. See id. at 571-72.
84. See id. at 568.
85. See id. at 571.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG and NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-
418/01, [2004] E.C.R. _, 28.
88. Id.
2005]
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2. Was the "refusal ... preventing the emergence of a
new product for which there is a potential consumer demand"? 9
Yes; the refusal would - as intended - prevent the emergence
of an electronic market, which was launched to compete with
the "out-cry" market.9 °
3. Was the refusal unjustified?91 A fact-finder could find:
Yes. This would be so unless a decision not to license IP is its
own justification.92
4. Does the refusal exclude any competition on the mar-
ket for execution of the futures contracts?93 Apparently, yes. If,
as alleged, the settlement prices were merely derived from appli-
cation of a formula, the inference that a duty to deal would not
impair creativity would strengthen ICE's case.9 4 If ICE could
prove the facts it alleged, NYMEX would seem to be a relatively
easy case for an abuse of dominance violation under EU law.
NYMEX is a stronger case for liability than is IMS because: 1)
ICE more clearly had a new product (an electronic market) that
was a dynamic addition to competition and could not be carried
on without access to the settlement-price standard;9" 2) in IMS
the beneficiaries/consumers of the data participated in the crea-
tion of the IP and presumably had some power to protect them-
selves;96 and 3) the existence of two separate markets is clearer
89. Id. 1 38.
90. The New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX") responded to the competi-
tion not only by trying to cut off ICE from use of the settlement prices but also by
creating its own electronic market. See NYMEX, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
91. See IMS, [2004] E.C.R. __, 38.
92. This justification seems more attractive under U.S. law than under European
law. Compare In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.2d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), with
Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). The
reliance on IP rights in NYMEX seems to be an afterthought, as it was in Kodak. See
Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1219. Free riding was not the issue, since ICE was willing to pay for
use of the settlement prices. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504
U.S. 451 (1992):
[A] ccording to Kodak, the [independent service organizations] are free-riding
because they have failed to enter the equipment and parts markets. This un-
derstanding of free-riding has no support in our case law. To the contrary, as
the Court of Appeals noted, one of the evils proscribed by the antitrust laws is
the creation of entry barriers to potential competitors by requiring them to
enter two markets simultaneously.
Id. at 485 (footnote omitted).
93. See IMS, [2004] E.C.R. __ 38.
94. See NYMEX, 323 F. Supp. 2d 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
95. See id.
96. See IMS, [2004] E.C.R. __, 9 5.
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in NYMEX than in IMS.9 7
NYMEX is also a stronger case for liability than is Trinko for
three reasons. First, regulation. In Trinko, the regulator had
and enforced rules to give rival local telecom service providers
non-discriminatory access to the local loop, and the period of
degraded service to rivals was short, the harm was remedied, and
the period of harm was apparently over.98 In NYMEX, the CFTC
had the power to order sufficient access to the settlement prices;
but it had not done so,99 and long experience shows that regula-
tory agencies are often more sympathetic to incumbents than to
competition. 100 No good reason existed to trust the regulator
more than open market competition as preserved by antitrust.
Second, the Trinko Court made a point of the fact that the ele-
ments to which Verizon's downstream rivals needed access were
not previously either visible or on the market.'0 ' In ATYMEX the
settlement prices were an existing product.10 2 They were open,
obvious and demanded. 0 3 Third, in Trinko the Court character-
ized Verizon's default as a mere "regulatory lapse" and saw no
sign of Verizon's intent to harm competition. 10 4 By contrast,
NYMEX's purpose and intent and the probable effect of its con-
duct was to harm competition. 105
In short, NYMEX's conduct harmed competition.1 0 6 It pre-
vented emergence of new competition against a monopolist in
the principal market.107 It did so by withholding access to a nec-
97. See NYMEX, 323 F. Supp. at 559.
98. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 405, 407 (2004).
99. See NYMEX, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
100. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 134-52 (D.D.C.
1981) (revealing history of regulatory toleration of AT&T's restraints; AT&T's anticom-
petitive conduct was normally consistent with FCC regulation).
101. SeeVerizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004).
102. See NYMEX, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63 (explaining how the settlement prices
were decided upon).
103. See id. at 563.
104. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. This, however, was contrary to the alleged facts.
Plaintiff alleged that Verizon degraded service to rivals to handicap them in their com-
petition and thereby induce its customers not to abandon it.
105. See NYMEX, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 572. The court, however, found that there was
no evidence that this was their sole purpose.
106. See id. at 560.
107. See id.
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essary input which was merely mechanistic, not creative.118
NYMEX had no reason to withhold this input other than to
harm competition in a second market (the principal market)."'
But under U.S. law there was no antitrust cause of action be-
cause the plaintiff could not meet the formalistic requirements
of prior voluntary course of dealing 1 ° and sacrifice of profits."'
V. FORM AND STYLE OF JURISPRUDENCE
Trinko and IMS present a contrast of styles. Trinko is pure
common law jurisprudence. IMS is a product of the European
Court of Justice's blend of common law and civil law jurispru-
dence. Moreover, the IMSjudgment itself is a product of a pro-
cedure that has no U.S. counterpart. A Member State court may
pose to the Court of Justice a question essentially asking what is
the EU law on point." 2 The Court's response is intended to en-
able the national court to apply the applicable EU law. The very
nature of this procedure tends to abstract the law from the facts
and to induce the "making" of law top down (theoretical) rather
than bottom up (inductive). The nature of the U.S. process
lends itself, contrariwise, to tightly limiting the law of the case to
the facts; courts are not charged with formulating general princi-
ples for purposes of future guidance, and normally abstain from
doing so. U.S. courts do not normally announce rules, but they
may articulate principles."13
A possible cost of the EU approach, especially on references
from national courts as in IMS, is that the European Court is
called upon to announce "the law" without the chance to appre-
ciate the variety of fact-configurations that may come within its
scope. If NYMEX-type facts should occur in Europe, this would
not be a problem, as this Essay demonstrates, for the IMS frame-
work is particularly fitting for the NYMEX case." 4 The pitfall
may be illustrated, rather, by the facts of the European Microsoft
108. See id. at 560, 563.
109. See id. at 572. The court, however, found that NYMEX had a "legitimate inter-
est" in disallowing competitors to free ride on their settlement prices.
110. See id. at 571.
111. See id.
112. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 234, OJ. C 224/1 (1992).
113. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (renouncing
"formalistic line drawing").
114. See generally IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG,
Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R. _.
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case. 115 In Microsoft, the European Commission found, among
other things, that Microsoft engaged in a strategy to give insuffi-
cient interface information to workgroup server rivals so that the
rivals' servers would function less well with Windows than did
Microsoft's servers.116 The interface information includes IP. 117
In examining the Microsoft facts under the rules of IMS, one
would naturally ask: Is Microsoft's conduct a refusal to license
within IMS? Should exclusion of all competition in the work-
group server market be a necessary condition to an Article 82
abuse? Or should it be enough if Microsoft's conduct had the
purpose and effect of handicapping competitors, entrenching
Microsoft's dominance, and thereby hurting consumers? How-
ever these questions should be answered, it is apparent that the
IMS conditions were not tailored for a Microsoft case; yet they
could govern it because the pronouncement in IMS is categori-
cal.
The United States has a different style of jurisprudence.
Americans often pride themselves on the inductive flexibility
and judicial limits provided by the common law system. Yet
Trinko and the cases in its aftermath do not fully fit the model.
The Trinko Court did much more than decide the case before it.
If constraint were the guide, the Court may have dismissed the
case for lack of standing, as the three-Justice concurrence would
have done." 8 Even addressing the merits, the Court might have
dismissed the case on the basis of the unusually tight connection
between the pro-competitive regulatory commands and the
plaintiffs' antitrust claims; that is, it might have handled the case
solely as a regulated industries case. Alternatively, it might have
ruled that the period of denial of full access was so short as to be
trivial, thus below the radar screen of Section 2. But the Court
went much farther. It took the opportunity to reframe the juris-
prudence of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, declaring a strong
principle of freedom-to-not-deal and denouncing "forced shar-
ing" ordered by courts. 9 Although the Trinko Court did not go
115. Commission Decision No. Comp/C-3/37.792/EEC, [2004] E.C. Comm. 1,
available at http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECComm/2004/1.html (last visited May
10, 2005); stay of relief denied; appeal from Commission decision pending.
116. See id. 747, 992.
117. See id. 190.
118. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411-15.
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so far as to declare a liability test for Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, ironically, lower courts have done so in the name of Trinko,
mechanistically using the Court's bases for distinguishing Aspen
Skiing to set up necessary conditions for a Section 2 violation. 12
Despite their idiosyncrasies, Trinko and IMS tellingly reveal
basic characteristics and trend-lines of their own systems. Trinko
embodies the sentiment of twenty-first century U.S. policy to be-
ware antitrust intervention against non-cartel activity, and espe-
cially to avoid positive duties. IMS, while demonstrating some
reserve regarding duties to deal, nonetheless proceeds to pro-
nounce the necessary conditions for a refusal-to-deal abuse. 121
NYMEX does not test the limits of IMS, as the Microsoft case
could do, but it does test the limits of Trinko. Even if one must
acknowledge that competition in futures contracts would be en-
hanced by competing markets' access to the standard settlement
prices, Justice Scalia would surely stand by his penultimate lines
in Trinko: Section 2 of the Sherman Act "seeks merely to prevent
unlawful monopolization.... The Sherman Act ... does not give
judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of do-
ing business whenever some other approach might yield greater
competition." 122
While carte blanche is out of the question, Article 82 serves a
more activist mission.
120. See, e.g., Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Ad. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 672-73,
675-76 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Metronet Serv. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1131-34
(9th Cir. 2004); Covad Communications Co. v. Bell South Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1048-49
(11 th Cir. 2004); Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1296-
97 (11th Cir. 2004); Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., 331 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 535-39 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
121. IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/
01, [2004] E.C.R. _.
122. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415-16.
